Army, predisposed to fight a conventional enemy that fought using conventional tactics, overpowered innovative ideas from within the Army and from outside it. ![]() Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker has written that in Vietnam, “The U.S. The story of how the Army found itself less than ready to fight an insurgency goes back to the Army’s unwillingness to internalize and build upon the lessons of Vietnam. Army on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war against America from the shadows. It was, however, unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U.S. The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army indeed, it had no peer in that arena. ![]() NaglĪlthough there were lonely voices arguing that the Army needed to focus on counterinsurgency in the wake of the Cold War-Dan Bolger, Eliot Cohen, and Steve Metz chief among them-the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency by Lt. ![]() The University of Chicago Press donates a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation™, a private-public partnership that supports America’s military.
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